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Abstract
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) was subjected to repeated repeal and replace efforts in the United States Congress in 2017.
Attempts to repeal and replace the law failed, but penalties for not complying with its mandate that individuals purchase
health insurance were removed in tax legislation passed late in the year and administrative actions taken by President
Trump yielded additional concerns about the stability of the law’s reform approach and the expanded health insurance
access that it created. This article explores public advocacy efforts by key interest groups from three major policy sectors—
health providers, the insurance industry, and the business community—that had served as an “axis of opposition” to past
American healthcare reform efforts. It identifies resource and incentive policy feedback effects that appear likely to in-
fluence these groups due to design features of the ACA and assesses whether patterns of advocacy efforts in 2017 are
consistent with what might be expected if these design features had their predicted effects. Our assessment reveals pat-
terns of interest group advocacy that are consistent with what might be expected to arise from resource and incentive
based policy feedback effects, and interest group political dynamics that differ from what was in place prior to passage
of the ACA. It also reveals advocacy patterns that are not well explained by resource and incentive based policy feedback
effects, and—in so doing—yields insights that are relevant to the design of policy reforms and future research.
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1. Introduction
During 2017, the Affordable Care Act (ACA)1 and a num-
ber of its key provisions were subjected to repeated
“repeal” and “replace” efforts in the United States (US)
Congress. In this article, we identify policy positions and
discuss advocacy activities by key stakeholder groups
whose interests were affected by major design features
of the ACA. We focus on advocacy efforts associated
with interest groups from three sectors—healthcare
providers, insurance, and businesses, sectors which have
been called the “axis of opposition” to healthcare reform
in the past (Brown, 2011). Our analysis yields insights rel-
evant to Congress’s consideration of ACA repeal and re-
place efforts in 2017 and the use of policy reform designs
that seek to foster resource and incentive-based policy
feedback effects.
The ACA repeal and replacement debates in 2017
reflect a pattern of policymaking that has become
more common in recent years. For decades, scholars
1 The ACA is formally entitled the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), which is actually comprised of two pieces of legislation enacted in
the first half of 2010. Like many others, we use the “ACA” title in this article.
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have asserted that “policies create politics” (Lowi, 1972;
Schattschneider, 1935), and these arguments have fallen
on receptive ears as scholars have documented an in-
creasingly crowded “policy space” in modern governance
(Hogwood&Peters, 1982). Scholars nowwidely recognize
that policymaking often seeks to alter and/or undo poli-
cies that have already been enacted. While policy feed-
back studies have proliferated due to this recognition,
they have often focused on broad discussions of policy
feedback effects and studies of mass public reactions to
policy reforms (Campbell, 2012). Resource and incentive
effects, while widely recognized, appear under-studied—
perhaps because material incentives that typically under-
lie them are widely recognized motivators of political ad-
vocacy. We seek to address this gap in the literature and
offer insights on interest group dynamics associated with
the ACA and the connections between policy design, re-
source and incentive effects, and policy advocacy.
2. The ACA: An Overview of the Law and Its
Consideration in Congress
The 2017 attacks on the ACA reform, or “Obamacare”,
were not surprising. The ACA was partisan and contro-
versial in 2010 when it was debated and passed, and it
continued to be so after enactment. The law’s opponents
have challenged the ACA in the US courts and voted to
pass bills in Republican controlled Congresses seeking to
repeal the law after its enactment, despite certain veto
by President Obama, who signed the ACA into law. With
the election of President Trump in 2016 and a Republican
controlled Congress which had campaigned on ACA re-
peal and replacement, efforts to roll back the law in 2017
surprised no one.
In 2009 and 2010, the Democratic Congress that en-
acted the ACA was eager to take advantage of its control
of Congress and theWhite House to achieve a legislative
goal that had evaded it in the past. One key element of
the legislative strategy was to build support, or at least
some level of tacit cooperation, from key groups that had
stymied healthcare reform in the past (Brill, 2015; Jacobs
& Skocpol, 2010; Quadagno, 2011). These groups, which
Lawrence Brown has referred to as the “axis of opposi-
tion”, included healthcare providers, the insurance indus-
try, and the business community (Brown, 2008, 2011),
and the ACA was designed in ways that would yield re-
source flows to these groups as it also sought expanded
access to health insurance, lower healthcare costs, and
increased healthcare quality.
The healthcare access provisions of the ACA ex-
panded health insurance availability in multiple ways.
First, the law included regulatory requirements on health
insurance companies. These included requirements that
insurance companies cover dependent children on their
parents’ health insurance policies to age 26, a prohibi-
tion against health insurance requirements that discrim-
inate against individuals with pre-existing health condi-
tions, and requirements that health insurance policies
cover certain “essential” health benefits2. Second, the
law expanded eligibility for Medicaid to include more
low-income people—specifically, childless adults. How-
ever, the federal enforcement mechanism for expand-
ingMedicaid (elimination of federal Medicaid reimburse-
ments to states choosing not to participate)was ruled un-
constitutional by the US Supreme Court in the National
Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB) vs. Sebelius
(2012) case3, which made the Medicaid expansion op-
tional for states. However, by May 2017, 32 states—
including Washington DC—had opted to participate in
Medicaid expansion (Dhue& Tausche, 2017; Russell Sage
Foundation, 2017). Third, the law required Americans to
purchase health insurance or face a tax penalty for fail-
ing to do so, and it enabled development of health in-
surance exchanges in each state where individuals could
purchase insurance policies to comply with this mandate.
Fourth, the law provided federal subsidies to lower- and
middle-income people through insurance premium tax
credits and cost sharing payments. And fifth, the law re-
quired employerswith 50 ormore full-time employees to
offer health insurance coverage for their employees, and
it also provided targeted subsidies to smaller employers
to assist them in paying costs associated with coverage.
The ACA also included provisions to reduce health-
care costs and increase the quality of healthcare4, but
these goals were probably less relevant to pacifying the
“axis of opposition” than were the access related provi-
sions. As a result of the access-expanding provisions dis-
cussed above, by September 2016, the proportion of the
US population without health insurance had dropped by
more than 20 million to 28.2 million (National Center
for Health Statistics, 2017). This expanded healthcare ac-
cesswas enabled by a reform strategy focused on increas-
ing the number of persons seeking services from health-
care providers, expanding the numbers of persons with
health insurance, and further supporting employment-
based health insurance. All of these areas of focus re-
flected a strategywhich sought to align the access related
goals of the law with the economic interests of health-
care providers, the insurance industry, and businesses.
While the election of President Trump and a
Republican Congress in 2016 made repeal and replace-
ment efforts inevitable, the Congressional debate over
these measures and the repeated failures associated
with them were not widely predicted. As Senator John
McCain articulated in his widely covered speech on the
floor of theUS Senate preceding his deciding vote against
one of the repeal and replace bills, the Congressional de-
bates and consideration of the repeal and replacement
2 These benefits were established by regulation in 2014, and included wellness and preventive care, mental health services, dental care for children,
and others.
3 This case also upheld the constitutionality of the individual mandate to purchase health insurance as a legitimate exercise of Congress’s powers under
the US Constitution.
4 For an overview of the ACA, see Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013.
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of Obamacare did not follow “regular order”. It was a
highly partisan process with few formal hearings and lit-
tle opportunity for public and interest group input. As a
result, to a significant degree, the debate that did occur
took place in themedia. In spite of these unusual circum-
stances (or, given Senator McCain’s speech and decisive
vote, perhaps in part because of them?), all four major
ACA repeal bills considered were defeated in the Senate.
In spite of these defeats in Congress, ACA opponents
did experience some public policy successes in weaken-
ing the law—particularly during the latter part of 2017.
The Trump administration took administrative actions to
weaken the law in the fall of 2017, including elimination
of cost-sharing payments to insurance companies to off-
set the costs of medical treatments for high risk/cost per-
sons. Congress also repealed tax penalties for individuals
failing to comply with the “individual mandate” to pur-
chase health insurance in a tax reform bill passed late
in the year. These and other policy changes clearly un-
dermined the reform, and created further uncertainties
around individual healthcare insurance markets across
the states. Viewed in totality, these actions also further
undermined the stability of individual health insurance
markets, which had already been compromised by re-
duced national efforts to publicize open enrollment peri-
ods for healthcare insurance exchanges, with the result
that a number of health insurance companies sought to
reduce their participation in the exchanges.
3. Theoretical Foundations: Policy Feedback Effects
and ACA Policy Advocacy
Resources have long been recognized as amotivating fac-
tor for interest group engagement in pluralist theory and
in American government (Dahl, 1971). Interest groups
engage to protect their material interest. However, stud-
ies of the tie between interest group engagement and
resources and related incentives have not often been
a major point of focus in studies of policy feedback.
Broadly speaking, policy feedback refers to “howpolicies,
once passed, influence political dynamics going forward”
(Lowi, 1972; Patashnik, 2008, p. 29; Schattschneider,
1935). While there are several approaches to the study
of policy feedback (see Jacobs & Weaver, 2015, for an
overview), our work here is particularly informed by
work in the historical institutionalist tradition (Patashnik,
2008; Pierson, 1993).
While scholars have argued that policy affects politics
for quite some time (Lowi, 1972; Schattschneider, 1935),
Pierson called attention to policy feedback effects and
offered a framework for understanding differing forms
they can take (Pierson, 1993). He argued that policy feed-
back may affect interest groups, state actors and capac-
ities, and mass publics, and suggested that it can take
different forms. One form of policy feedback relates to
resource effects, which is the impact of public policies
in conferring resources on particular groups or individ-
uals. Incentive effects, by contrast, refer to the manner
in which public policies “influence the probability of par-
ticular outcomes and the payoffs attached to those out-
comes” (Pierson, 1993, p. 598). While these two kinds of
policy feedback effects are analytically distinct, they may
both contribute to the development of material stakes
or investments on the parts of particular interest groups,
which—in turn—may affect their constituency interests
and the diversity and cohesiveness of their policy advo-
cacy efforts (Patashnik, 2008, p. 31). Interpretive effects,
by contrast, focus on public policies as sources of infor-
mation and meaning, which can also affect subsequent
political and policymaking processes by influencing how
groups and individuals obtain and interpret information
(Pierson, 1993, p. 611).
Policy feedback effects also differ regarding their
likely impacts on subsequent policymaking. Scholars of
policy feedback in the historical institutionalist tradi-
tion have suggested that policy may be self-reinforcing
(“positive”) or self-undermining (“negative”), depend-
ing on whether its effects tend to induce policy stabil-
ity/expansion or policy rollback/re-orientation (Jacobs &
Weaver, 2015; Weaver, 2010). They have also empha-
sized the time-dependent characteristics of policy feed-
back and the post-enactment patterns of group support
and/or opposition that may occur over time (Karch &
Rose, 2017; Pierson, 2000). Taken together, these and
other considerations mean that existing policies may in-
fluence subsequent policymaking in ways that vary both
over time and across policies.
Patashnik (2008) drew upon the conceptual founda-
tions in Pierson’s work and emphasized the importance
of policy feedback in influencing the sustainability of pub-
lic interest reforms. In this regard, he argued that two
“over-arching feedback effects are crucial” (Patashnik,
2008, p. 31). These feedback effects relate to the effect
of the reformon identities and cohesion of key stakehold-
ers and to the impact of the reformon the investments of
key actors. In the latter case, where interest group invest-
ments associated with the reform are substantial, policy
advocates are expected to mobilize to protect those in-
vestments. By contrast, where investments are modest,
political advocacy in support of the reform are expected
to be minimal as well. In the former case, stable group
identities and political affiliations may yield stable con-
stituencies which advocate cohesively in defense of the
reform. By contrast, more fluidity in stakeholder group
coalitions may make interest group advocacy patterns
more unpredictable.
An important point to recognize in this regard is that
the ability of policies to enable major post-reform in-
vestments and stable coalitions of interest groups are
not pre-determined. Rather, these kinds of policy feed-
back effects – and therefore the capacity of reforms
to “remake politics”—is “contingent, conditional, and
contested” (Patashhnik & Zelizer, 2013). Relatedly, one
would therefore expect that the existence of significant
post-reform investments and more stabilized coalitions
would increase the likelihood of stronger advocacy ef-
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forts in support of the reform, butwould not determine it
altogether. In short, the path from policy design features
of a reform to stakeholder investments and strengthened
and stabilized stakeholder coalitions supporting the re-
form to clear and effective advocacy efforts is probabilis-
tic and path dependent rather than fully predetermined
by the design of the reform.
Since the ACA’s enactment, Patashnik and others
have drawn on this body of policy feedback literature
to analyze prospects for the law’s sustainability. While
this literature on the ACA is multifaceted, much of it has
emphasized the complexity of the law’s design and the
potential confusion that this complexity yields for mass
publics (Oberlander &Weaver, 2015; Patashnik & Zelizer,
2013). Other portions of it have focused on the impor-
tance of partisanship in affecting citizen perceptions of
the ACA and its implementation (Chattopadhyay, 2018;
Oberlander, 2016).
Missing from this literature is any systematic attempt
to assess the extent to which groups that are economi-
cally affected by the law are taking clear positions in re-
gard to it or taking active steps to protect their interests.
Similarly missing is any attempt to understand whether
or not key groups affected by the law are advocating for
or against it in cohesive fashion, or are engaging it pat-
terns of advocacy that are tied to specific threats to their
resource-based interests. In this article, we begin an ini-
tial effort to fill these gaps in the literature on the ACA
and its sustainability.
4. Analytical Approach
To assess likely resource-incentive policy feedback ef-
fects associated with the ACA’s policy design and policy
advocacy efforts of affected groups relating to repeal and
replacement of the ACA in 2017, we draw on existing lit-
erature to discuss the likely resource-incentive effects of
the ACA on groups within the healthcare, insurance, and
business sectors.We also investigate patterns of ACA pol-
icy advocacy in 2017 for seven key groups in these sec-
tors. Our investigations focus on two broad questions:
Question 1: Did key groups from the healthcare, in-
surance, and business sectors actively support the ACA
and its key access related provisions against attempts to
repeal/replace it in 2017?
Question 2: To what degree do patterns of inter-
est group policy advocacy during the 2017 ACA re-
peal/replace debates in the US Congress reflect: a) advo-
cacy consistent with resource-incentive policy feedback
effects?; b) the development of cohesive coalitions sup-
portive of the ACA?, and; c) chronological variations in
advocacy efforts that appear tied to resource-incentive
based interests?
4.1. Descriptions of the Groups and Rationale
Our analysis focuses on key groups which constitute sig-
nificant portions of Brown’s “axis of opposition” to past
healthcare reform efforts and which were cultivated by
policy design features of the ACA.We chose these groups
from the healthcare, insurance, and business sectors,
based on the likelihood they would be affected by the
law and its implementation, as well as their key historical
roles in healthcare reform policy debates (Brown, 2011).
The American Medical Association (AMA) is the
largest single physician group in the US, with member-
ship of approximately 20% of all practicing physicians.
However, the association also represents many more
physicians, estimated at around 90%, through its House
of Delegates (Graham, 2016). More than 190 medical
society specialties and state level societies cast votes
on policies in this forum (Graham, 2016). The AMA has
also spent substantially more on lobbying than any other
healthcare professional group (OpenSecrets, n.d.).
The American Hospital Association (AHA) is the na-
tional organization that represents hospitals and health
care networks. Its membership is approximately 5,000
hospitals, health care systems, networks, and care
providers, along with 43,000 individual members (AHA],
2018). The Federation of American Hospitals (FAH) is the
national advocate for investor-owned or managed com-
munity hospitals and health systems in the US. Its mem-
bership includes over 1,100 health care facilities. Both
groups were included in the analysis in order to ensure
that both non-profit and for-profit health care facilities
are represented.
America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) is the
national association representing insurance providers.
AHIP states that it “advocates for public policies that
expand access to affordable health care coverage to
all Americans through a competitive marketplace that
fosters choice, quality, and innovation” (AHIP, 2018).
Their membership includes life and health insurance
companies, managed care organizations, Blue Cross and
Blue Shield Plans, self-funded plans, cooperatives, fra-
ternal societies, diseasemanagement organizations, HSA
banks, and third party administrators (AHIP, 2018). AHIP
represents more than 175 insurance organizations.
The US Chamber of Commerce is the world’s largest
business organization representing the interests of more
than 3 million businesses of all sizes, sectors, and re-
gions ranging from small local businesses to large indus-
try leaders (US Chamber, n.d.). The National Federation
of Independent Business (NFIB) is an organization that
advocates for small business owners. It has approxi-
mately 325,000members and locations in all 50US states
and Washington DC. Their policy areas of interest in-
clude healthcare, taxes, labor, and regulatory reform
(NFIB, n.d.). The Small Business Majority provides edu-
cation and resources to their network of around 55,000
small business owners and over 1,000 business groups
in the United States. Their purpose is policy advocacy
and entrepreneurship, focusing on issues related to cap-
ital, healthcare, taxes, retirement, paid leave and other
policies directly impacting entrepreneurship (Small Busi-
ness Majority, n.d.). The Chamber of Commerce and
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NFIB are among the top business organizations spend-
ing on lobbying activities (OpenSecrets, n.d.). The SBM
is a liberal leaning organization that represents business
interests that are not well represented by the other
two groups included in the business sector portion of
our sample. Small business owners, self-employed indi-
viduals, and small business employees are reported to
make up more than half of enrollees in ACA marketplace
plans (Chase & Arensmeyer, 2018). Similarly, a 2017 US
Treasury Department analysis shows that small business
and self-employed sole proprietor tax filers were more
likely to obtain health insurance coverage through an ex-
change plan than other employee types included in their
analysis (US Department of Treasury, 2017). SBM’s focus
appears well aligned with these small business interests.
4.2. Data Collection
Because debates about the ACA have often focused on
the law as a whole, we focused initial attention on policy
feedback associated with the entire law. However, we
are also concerned about the portions of the law that
have resource implications for the groups we are inves-
tigating, so we also collected data on positions of key
groups on its healthcare access related provisions.
Key access related provisions of the ACA relate
to regulating health insurance, expanding individual
healthcare insurance markets, and strengthening the
employment-based portion of the healthcare insur-
ance market. Specific insurance regulatory provisions in-
cluded requirements that insurance policies cover de-
pendents until age 26, individuals with pre-existing con-
ditions, and certain essential health benefits. The individ-
ual health insurance market-related provisions include
Medicaid expansion, the individual mandate and asso-
ciated health insurance exchanges, and individual insur-
ance subsidies. The employment market-related provi-
sions we investigated include the mandate that employ-
ers with 50 or more employees provide health insurance
and the tax subsidies that accrue to employers to offset
costs of healthcare provision.
To investigate advocacy-related activities of the
above groups in 2017, we reviewed the websites of the
selected groups, and supplemented that review with key
word searches to identify documents and evidence gen-
erated by those groups but not foundon the groups’web-
sites5. Our searches focused in two areas: 1) the taking
of a public position in support or opposition of the ACA
as a whole and of the key access related provisions men-
tioned above and 2) the nature and intensity of policy
advocacy relating to the law, as indicated by the types of
advocacy activities undertaken and the number of advo-
cacy efforts identified by documents obtained through
our searches. While we focused particularly on policy
advocacy relevant to ACA repeal and replacement de-
bates during 2017, our website and key word searches
also yielded evidence regarding group positions and pol-
icy feedback efforts undertaken prior to that year. Earlier
data that are not relevant to the 2017 repeal and replace-
ment debates are not directly addressed in our findings,
but do inform our discussions of ACA policy advocacy.
To ascertain the positions and advocacy activities of
the organizations investigated, we collected: 1) position
statements; 2) documents reflecting efforts to influence
legislation such as letters to key policy decision-makers
and Congressional testimony, and; 3) documents reflect-
ing efforts targeted toward the broader public, such as
public statements and press releases. We then coded the
documents to reflect support or opposition for the ACA
and its provisions, as well as the nature and extent of pol-
icy feedback effort undertaken by each of the groupsmen-
tioned above. Our coding also differentiated between pol-
icy advocacy efforts by individual groups in our sample
and efforts in which groups in our sample joined together
to advocate for their shared interests.We also coded data
based on timing associated with key chronological stages
in the 2017 ACA Congressional debates.
4.3. Coding and Analysis
Our website reviews and internet searches enabled iden-
tification of documents developed by the seven interest
groups to advocate publicly regarding the ACA and/or its
access related provisions in 2017. We used these docu-
ments to code the groups’ public support or opposition
to the ACA as a whole in 2017 and—where possible—
to key provisions as well. We applied a three-point cod-
ing scheme:
• O—Clear/documented opposition to the law/
provision;
• N—Neutral—no clear/documented position
found/identified;
• S—Clear/documented support for the law/
provision.
The second portion of our analysis focused on ascer-
taining the extent and nature of policy advocacy based
on the documents collected. Documents reflecting pol-
icy advocacy were coded to reflect the types of advo-
cacy undertaken, including letters to decision-makers
and testimony before Congress and press releases and
public statements disseminated toward the broader pub-
lic. We also analyzed chronological patterns of policy ad-
vocacy efforts to ascertain how they aligned with key
stages of the repeal and replace debate in Congress dur-
ing 2017. And finally, we also identified the extent to
which the groups we investigated coalesced with one an-
other to express their interests jointly, based on the doc-
uments collected.
5 This keyword search data collection effort involved identifying the groups we are investigating and conducting keyword searches on the worldwide web
based on their names, specific repeal/replacement efforts (“American Healthcare Act”, for example), the ACA, and key ACA provisions being investigated.
Documents resulting from those searches were then collected, organized, and stored electronically for use and reference.
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5. Findings
Our findings suggest that groups in all three key inter-
est group sectors advocated for or against specific ACA
provisions in ways that are consistent with their per-
ceptions of their resource-incentive based interests, al-
though these interests were not clear-cut in all cases
and positions varied across groups. Table 1 summarizes
findings on advocacy positions taken by groups in our
sample, and Tables 2 and 3 summarize data collected
on the extent of advocacy efforts identified and the tim-
ing of these efforts, respectively. Below, we review avail-
able information relevant to resource-incentive impacts
of the ACA, and discuss findings presented in these ta-
bles, by sector.
5.1. The Healthcare Sector: Hospitals and Healthcare
Providers
The ACA and its implementation has had significant im-
pacts on American healthcare providers. Impacts on hos-
pitals are relatively well-documented, as hospitals saw
an increase in patient volumedue to growth in the health
insured population and hospital admissions are reported
to have grown approximately 3–4% a year prior to 2017
(Barkholz, 2017). Also, under US law, hospitals are re-
quired to provide care to the indigent, and the ACA’s
expansion of Medicaid is reported to have helped re-
duce burdens associatedwith this care—by$6.2 billion in
Medicaid expansion states alone (Dranove, Garthwaite,
& Ody, 2017). Indeed, the FAH and the AHA jointly com-
missioned a study of the impact of ACA repeal on hos-
pitals, and it found that loss of insurance coverages as-
sociated with ACA repeal would lead to hospital revenue
losses of $165 billion ormore (Dobson, DaVanzo, Haught,
& Luu, 2016).
The economic impacts of the ACA on (non-hospital)
healthcare providers appear less well documented.
Some have argued that healthcare providers have been
negatively impacted by the law due to costs associated
with increased healthcare regulation (Anderson, 2014),
while others have argued that the healthcare industry
has benefited from increased patient volume and em-
ployment associated with the expanded availability of
health insurance (Page, 2013; Zhen, 2015). These com-
peting conclusions suggest that the ACA’s impacts are
complex and may affect individual healthcare providers
differently. Recent polls, however, suggest that only
15.1% of primary care physicians support full repeal of
the law, while most (73%) support changes to the law
short of repeal (Pollack, Armstrong, & Grande, 2017).
While primary care physicians (PCPs) are only one spe-
cialty and are not representative of all physicians, “they
are important for informing the public debate, given
PCPs’ central role in the health care system” (Pollack
et al., 2017).
As the data presented in Table 1 indicate, the AHA,
the FAH, and the AMA all took positions supportive of
the ACA as a whole in 2017. They also took positions on
specific provisions of the law that were consistent with
their common economic interests. For example, during
the course of the year, all three groups took positions
supportive of ACA provisions onMedicaid expansion, the
individual mandate to purchase health insurance, and
cost-sharing paymentswhich subsidized healthcare costs
for specific individuals—all of which support their ongo-
ing interests in a steady stream of paying insurance and
healthcare service consumers. The AMA, AHA, and FAH
also took positions supportive of access-related health in-
surance regulatory provisions, which effectively expand
healthcare consumer markets, although their support of
these provisions—with the exception of the pre-existing
condition provision—appears less consistent than their
support for the individual health insurance market pro-
visions based on the documents we reviewed. Perhaps
not surprisingly, we did not find strong statements of
support (or opposition) from the groups in the health-
care provider sector regarding the employer mandate
and small business subsidies.
The data presented in Table 2 suggest that groups
in the healthcare provider sector were more actively en-
gaged in defending the ACA than were the groups we in-
vestigated fromother sectors. In the table,we report a to-
tal of 95 activities reflecting ACA policy advocacy efforts,
and 58 (61%) came from the three groups in this indus-
try sector. The advocacy efforts undertaken also appear
to reflect the relatively closed nature of the Congress’s
2017 deliberations on the ACA. Twenty-three of the doc-
uments compiled reflect direct communications to law-
makers through letters and/or testimony. By contrast,
of the advocacy documents identified, thirty-two were
press releases and public statements of various kinds,
suggesting that publicly oriented interest group advo-
cacy efforts may have been a more prevalent advocacy
approach than direct communications with legislators in
Congress. It is worth noting that there were multiple
cases where groups within the healthcare provider and
insurance sectors joined together to oppose specific re-
peal and replacement efforts. These coalition efforts in-
cluded activities to support continuation of cost reduc-
tion sharing payment subsidies to individuals, continua-
tion of the individual mandate, and Medicaid expansion.
The data in Table 3 reveal that advocacy efforts
by healthcare provider groups occurred throughout the
2017 year, but were most prevalent during the Spring
and Summermonths as repeal and replace bills were con-
sidered in the House and Senate. The first joint letters
we were able to identify involving these groups, AHIP,
and the US Chamber of Commercewere released in April
2017 and focused on support for continuation of cost
sharing payments.
5.2. The Health Insurance Industry
Insurance companies are major stakeholders in health
reform, as they are directly affected by both regulatory
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Table 1. Positions of key groups on the ACA and its healthcare access provisions, by sector for 2017.
ACA—Major Healthcare Access Provisions*
Industry Sector/ ACA Law as Health Insurance Provisions Individual Health Insurance Market Employment-Based HealthMajor Groups a Whole* Insurance Market
Sector Major Support vs Young Pre- Essential Medicaid Individual Individual Employer Small
Groups Opposition Adults on Existing Health Expansion Mandate Subsidies Mandate Business




Providers Medical S S S S S S
Association
American
Hospital S S S S S S
Association
Federation
of American S S S S S
Hospitals
Insurance AHIP S S S S S
Business NFIB O O O O
US Chamber O S O
Small
Business S S S S
Majority
Definitions: S = support for ACA law and/or provision(s); O = opposition to ACA law and/or provision(s); Empty Cell = Group positions were not clearly discernable from the data collected.
* Positions on the ACA and its provisions were coded based on documents from the groups involved that indicated group positions. For the ACA as a whole, opposition to one or more ACA repeal bills
in Congress in 2017 was interpreted as “support” (S) for the ACA, while clear statements of opposition to the law and/or support for one or more of the pieces of repeal legislation was interpreted as
opposition (O) to the ACA. Coding of positions on individual provisions was based on documents which addressed the provision and/or key concepts underlying it, and which were concurred on by the
group being assessed and/or released on its letterhead. Documents used for coding can be made available upon request.
Social Inclusion, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 3, Pages 190–204 196
Table 2. Advocacy efforts: Congressional consideration of ACA repeal & replace legislation.
Sectors & Groups Advocacy Documents/Efforts * Totals
Sectors Groups Policy & Letters to Press Total Total Sector Total Joint
Issue Briefs Decision-makers & Releases/Public Advocacy Efforts/ Advocacy
(joint Testimony Before Statements Efforts Documents Efforts**




AMA 1 7 (2) 13 (3) 21 5
AHA 1 (1)*** 10 (4) 14 (2) 25 58 7
FAH 1 (1)*** 6 (4) 5 (2) 12 7
Insurance AHIP 0 8 (3) 4 (2) 12 12 5
Business
NFIB 0 4 3 7
25
0
Chamber of 1*** 4 (2) 2 (1) 7 3Commerce
Small
Business 0 0 11 11 0
Majority
Totals 4 39 52 95
Definitions: Policy & Issue Briefs—documents focusing primarily on providing information and analysis concerning one or more issues
relating to ACA.
Letters & Testimony Before Congress—Letters, testimony, and/or statements targeted toward key federal ACA decision-makers.
Press Releases/Public Statements—Press releases or statements targeted toward the broader public.
Notes: * The numbers in the cells of this table indicate documents identified, which—in turn—reflect “efforts” of each of the groups
relevant to ACA repeal and replace consideration in 2017; ** “Joint” documents are ones signed and/or released by more than
one of the seven groups in this table. They reflect collaborative efforts by these groups to provide information and/or advocate for
shared interests and/or concerns. The “Total Joint Advocacy Efforts” column of the table identifies the number of “joint” documents
involving each group, and it reflects the sum of joint advocacy documents/efforts of each type (ie. briefs, letters/testimony, & Press
Releases/public statements) shown in parentheses [“( )”] for each group; *** These policy briefs are dated in December 2016, but
informed 2017 repeal and replace deliberations.
changes in the insurance industry and efforts to expand
health insurance access. While recent studies point to-
ward challenges in setting premiums based on new and
changing insurance rules in expanding individual insur-
ance markets and the importance of the re-insurance
supports provided by the ACA (Hall & McCue, 2016),
broader analyses accounting for Medicaid and Medicare
revenues reveal substantial gains in stock prices and
point toward positive financial performances in the in-
dustry as a whole (Sommer, 2017). In this turbulent con-
text, insurance companies have repeatedly argued for ef-
forts to stabilize insurance markets, which allow them to
gain experience necessary to set premiums at levels that
cover their costs. In this context, the impacts of the ACA
on the insurance industry appear variable to date (Hall &
McCue, 2016), but there is clear and common interest in
market stability which enables insurance companies to
be profitable over the long term.
In 2017, after releasing a statement to the House
Ways and Means Committee which identified ways to
enable broad participation in the individual health insur-
ancemarket without an individual mandate (AHIP, 2017),
AHIP—the primary national association representing in-
surance companies in Washington DC—consistently op-
posed proposals to repeal and/or replace the ACA. As
the findings in Table 1 suggest, it also provided consis-
tent support for key provisions associated with expand-
ing the individual health insurance market—Medicaid
expansion, the individual mandate, and individual sub-
sidies, including the cost share subsidies paid to insur-
ance companies to offset the costs of insuring a client
pool that now includes more high cost customers. AHIP
does not appear to have vocally opposed the expanded
insurance regulations ushered in by the law, even though
these regulations required changes in their operations
and payment of claimswhich insurance companiesmight
not have paid previously. While this may seem surprising
to some, this finding may reflect the recognition among
insurers that these regulations are a part of the agree-
ments struck with Congress to expand health insurance
markets as a part of the ACA.
The data in Tables 2 and 3 reveal significant efforts
by AHIP to influence Congress’s ACA deliberations dur-
ing 2017, and these efforts were most prevalent dur-
ing Senate consideration of repeal and replace legisla-
tion. Table 2 shows that we identified 12 documents
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Table 3. Advocacy efforts: Timeline of advocacy efforts during congressional consideration of ACA repeal & replace legis-
lation in 2017.
Sectors and Groups Group Documents/Efforts, Divided by Timing of Release*
Sectors Groups Months Prior to House Consideration Tax Bill and ACA Total Total
Introduction of Consideration of Bills in Administrative Advocacy Joint
ACA Repeal of the AHCA Senate Changes Efforts Advocacy
Legislation 3/7–5/4/17 5/5–9/30/17 10/1–12/31/17 Efforts
12/1/16–3/6/17 (joint (joint (joint




AMA 0 8 (1) 11 (2) 2 (2) 21 5
AHA 1 (1) 6 (2) 16 (2) 2 (2) 25 7
FAH 1 (1) 4 (2) 5 (2) 2 (2) 12 7
Insurance AHIP 1 2 (1) 7 (2) 2 (2) 12 5
Business
NFIB 1 3 3 0 7 0
Chamber of 1 4 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 7 3Commerce
Small
Business 0 5 6 0 11 0
Majority
Totals 5 32 49 9 95
Notes: * The numbers in the cells of this table indicate documents identified, which—in turn—reflect “efforts” of each of the groups rel-
evant to ACA repeal and replace consideration in 2017; ** “Joint” documents are ones signed and/or released by more than one of the
seven groups in this table. They reflect collaborative efforts by these groups to provide information and/or advocate for shared interests
and/or concerns. The “Total Joint Advocacy Efforts” column of the table identifies the total number of “joint” documents involving each
group, and it reflects the sum of joint advocacy documents/efforts undertaken by each group during the time periods covered by the
columns in the table, as shown in parentheses [“( )”] for each group.
reflecting AHIP policy advocacy efforts during 2017,
and—in contrast to the efforts identified by healthcare
providers—they were more frequently directed toward
Congressional policymakers through letters or testimony.
The table also reveals AHIP’s involvement in at least five
joint advocacy efforts, which included efforts to retain
cost sharing reduction payments and the individual man-
date to purchase health insurance. Table 3 reveals AHIP
advocacy efforts occurring throughout the year, with par-
ticular prevalence in the summer months as the Senate
debated the issue.
Overall, the positions taken by AHIP appear slightly
more nuanced than the relatively straightforward sup-
portive positions taken by the AHA and the AMA. Dur-
ing 2017, AHIP consistently advocated for ACA provisions
supportive of an expanded individual insurance market,
and particularly theMedicaid expansion and cost sharing
payments they have received under the law. They appear
to have been less vocal in providing feedback concern-
ing the employment based market provisions, perhaps
reflecting the fact that the ACA enabled more moderate
changes in thismarket than in the individualmarket. And,
not surprisingly, AHIP’s policy advocacy also focused on
maintaining stability for the insurancemarket as a whole.
5.3. The Business Sector
While observers agree that the ACA has affected Amer-
ican businesses economically, the nature and desirabil-
ity of these effects have been the subject of debate.
On one hand, the employer mandate and tax increases
might be diverting funds from company growth. Employ-
ers and groups representing them have also complained
about health insurance cost increases since enactment
of the law (NFIB, 2016). On the other hand, others in the
small business community have viewed the economic im-
pacts of the law more favorably, and have argued that
there have been reductions in the rate of health insur-
ance premium growth (SBM, 2017). They also point out
that expanded individual health insurance markets ben-
efit small business owners and employees have greater
access to health insurance, thus resulting in reduced “job
lock” which may enable smaller businesses to be more
competitive in attracting and retaining employees.
The data in Table 1 reveal that two of the three busi-
ness groups we investigated—themore established NFIB
and the US Chamber of Commerce—expressed clear op-
position to the ACA as whole during the 2017 Congres-
sional debates and particular opposition to the law’s em-
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ployer mandate. The NFIB also took clear positions in
opposition to other mandates in the law, including the
individual mandate to buy health insurance and the re-
quired essential health benefits package6. We identified
relatively fewer clear positions in opposition to other ac-
cess related provisions of the ACA on the part of the
Chamber of Commerce, but did find evidence of its sup-
port for continuation of cost sharing reduction payments.
By contrast, the SBMwas a vocal supporter of the ACA in
the face of themultiple repeal and replace efforts consid-
ered during 2017. The SBM has also voiced clear support
for key provisions of the ACA relating to pre-existing con-
ditions, Medicaid expansion, and subsidies for individu-
als to purchase health insurance.
A review of the data on advocacy efforts by business
groups in Tables 2 and 3 suggests that the extent of advo-
cacy activity carried out by the business groups we inves-
tigated was lower than what was identified for the other
sectors. Overall, we identified 25 documents reflecting
advocacy activities across all three business groups in our
sample. A disproportionate share of these documents
(11/25, or 44%) came from the SBM, which—in contrast
to the other two groups—opposed repeal and replace-
ment of the ACA. The kinds of policy advocacy activities
conducted by the three business groups we investigated
also varied. We identified a total of fourteen documents
reflecting policy advocacy efforts on the part of the NFIB
and the US Chamber of Commerce combined, and these
documents were split between efforts directed toward
Congressional decision-makers and the general public.
By contrast, we identified eleven documents reflecting
policy advocacy efforts on the part of the SBM, and these
documents predominantly reflected efforts to support
public understandings of the ACA’s impacts that are sup-
portive of the law’s continuation. It is noteworthy that
we also found that the Chamber of Commerce joined
with health provider and insurance groups in activities to
support the continuation of cost sharing reduction pay-
ments to subsidize higher cost patients on the individ-
ual market. And, as was the case for the other interest
group sectors we investigated, the data in Table 3 reveal
heightened interest group advocacy during the Spring
and Summer when Congress was debating ACA repeal
and replacement legislation.
Overall, the findings discussed above suggest that ad-
vocacy efforts of the two major business groups are not
much different than what might have been expected of
them prior to the ACA reform. In this sense, they appear
to remain a part of an “opposition” to the ACA health re-
form. It is also worth noting, however, that—at least as
measured by the extent of evidence on their advocacy
that is publicly available—the major two ACA opponent
groups, the NFIB and the Chamber of Commerce, appear
to have been less active in opposing the law than the
other groups were in supporting it. By contrast, the SBM
actively supported the ACA as expected, and it appears
to have been more active in supporting the law than the
NFIB and the Chamber of Commerce were in opposing it.
6. Discussion and Implications
The analyses above are best viewed as exploratory, but
they do suggest that interest group dynamics associated
with healthcare reform in the US have changed since
Brown (2008) articulated the obstructionist roles per-
formed by the “axis of opposition” about a decade ago.
In 2017, key healthcare provider groups and the insur-
ance industry appeared more supportive of health “re-
form” and healthcare access than they had been in the
past. They engaged actively to defend the law’s health
insurance access provisions on multiple occasions dur-
ing the year. However, the positions of major business
groups that have long opposed American healthcare re-
form efforts—the NFIB and the Chamber of Commerce,
in particular—remained similar to what they have been
in the past, even though the Chamber of Commerce did
actively support efforts by health provider groups and
the insurance industry to continue cost sharing reduc-
tion payments which supported stability in the health
insurance exchange markets. Our measures of the ex-
tent of group advocacy during 2017 also suggest that
advocacy efforts supporting repeal and replacement of
the law may have been less vociferous than the ef-
forts made by groups which opposed the law’s repeal
and/or replacement.
These findings are consistentwithwhat onemight ex-
pect if the access expansion provisions of the ACA actu-
ally had the kinds of resource-incentive policy feedback
effects that the law’s crafters had hoped would materi-
alize. Healthcare providers and the insurance industry
benefited from expanded customer bases in the individ-
ual market and from resource subsidies and incentives
that are tied to expanded access to healthcare. They took
positions in support of the law and actively supported
provisions that benefited them, including the cost shar-
ing reduction payments and the individual mandate to
purchase insurance. Their engagements in defending the
ACA are also apparent in their decision to combine ef-
forts with one another and go public with expanded ef-
forts to support continuation of cost sharing payments
and to oppose repeal of the individual mandate. Indeed,
the data we present above suggests that these groups
mobilized more actively to oppose repeal and replace ef-
forts than the business groups did to support them. All of
these findings, while preliminary, suggest that the strat-
egy of tying expanded access to healthcare in ways that
are consistent with the resource-incentive interests of
health providers and the insurance industry was at least
partially successful in building support for the ACA law.
However, the variations in policy advocacy patterns
presented in our analyses also suggest that resource-
incentive effects are subject to limitations affecting their
6 In addition, it is worth noting that NFIB was the plaintiff in the 2012 Supreme Court case that allowed states to decline participation in Medicaid
expansion, a point that is not reflected in Table 1’s presentation of findings regarding policy advocacy efforts undertaken in 2017.
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impacts on political advocacy. Some of these limitations
on the impact of resource-incentive effects are already
recognized in the policy feedback literature. First, re-
source effects of existing policiesmay not always be clear,
and they may also be experienced and perceived differ-
ently by different groups. Our analysis suggests multiple
possible effects of the ACA on the insurance industry,
some of which negatively impact industry resources (reg-
ulations requiring coverage of essential health benefits,
for example) and others which tend to enhance indus-
try resources (cost sharing subsidies, for example). How
these effects “net out” for the industry as a whole and
various members of it is not always clear. And, even if
there is clarity on net effects and their distribution across
groups, different groups may perceive these effects dif-
ferently. For example, the NFIB is particularly concerned
about regulations and costs to its members, while the
SBM perceives a need for small businesses and their em-
ployees to have better access to health insurance. Thus,
even clarity on resource-incentive effects may not nec-
essarily yield clarity regarding how these effects are val-
ued by differing groups, and these valuations may affect
the extent and nature of political support provided by af-
fected groups.
Second, resource-incentive effects do not fully ex-
plain policy advocacy patterns across ACA provisions. For
example, while small businesses might be expected to
oppose a mandate on employers to provide health insur-
ance, we find no evidence that the SBM opposed this
mandate. It thus appears that the positions of the or-
ganizations on individual ACA provisions may be driven
by other factors—including ideological orientations of
the groups themselves and strategic political consider-
ations tied to the overall mix of provisions in the law
and existing balances of political power—rather than by
the resource-incentive effects of particular provisions.
Groups with particular ideologies and/or strong ties to
the political party in power, for example, may accept cer-
tain policy provisions that are not in their interest in or-
der to maintain good relations with party leaders who
can aid them in other ways.
And finally, our investigations reveal not only uncer-
tainties and differing perceptions on resource-incentive
effects and potential strategic considerations relevant
to policy advocacy on individual provisions, but also
changes over time. This limitation associatedwith the im-
pact of policy feedback effects is well recognized in the
policy feedback literature (Karch & Rose, 2017; Patashnik
& Zelizer, 2013), and it—along with the factors above—
suggests that one cannot predict interest group policy ad-
vocacy on the basis of resource-incentive effects alone.
During the course of 2017, for example, the data pre-
sented above shows significant variations in the extent
of advocacy during the course of the year, with the most
extensive interest group engagement occurring during
the spring and summer months while repeal and reform
legislation was being considered. This is not surprising,
but does suggest that groups respond not only to re-
sources and incentives, but also to the extent of per-
ceived threat and opportunity in their environments at
particular points in time.
While our investigations focused primarily on the
2017 repeal and replace debates in Congress, our key
word searches yielded information not only on group
positions taken in 2017, but also on positions and feed-
back provided between 2010 after the law’s initial pas-
sage and the end of 2016. We uncovered evidence that
several groups—the AMA, AHIP, and the Chamber of
Commerce—became more supportive and/or less op-
posed to the ACA over time. For example, there was
early debate among AMA members on whether or not
to support the ACA (Meyer, 2010) and this debate was
eventually resolved in ways that led the AMA to sup-
port the law consistently in 2017. A similar strengthening
of support for the ACA’s individual mandate is apparent
in the trajectory of AHIP’s communications to Congress
on the individual mandate in 2017. Its early feedback
to Congress on the individual mandate, for example, ap-
peared to view the mandate’s repeal as inevitable, while
later feedback focused directly on preventing its repeal.
Within the business sector, by contrast, the Chamber of
Commerce appears to have vigorously opposed the law
through 2014, the yearmany of its key provisions took ef-
fect. After that, the Chamber’s President suggested that
the ACA was here to stay (Whitney, 2014). In this con-
text, it is perhaps not surprising that the Chamber’s pol-
icy advocacy in opposition to the law in 2017 appeared
less vocal than that of the NFIB, which appeared to op-
pose the law more vigorously and consistently. Consis-
tent with Patashnik’s (2008) analysis, the Chamber may
have reached the point where it simply accepted the ACA
and/or its overall structure as a new reality with which it
must deal.
All of the factors discussed above—uncertainty and
differing perceptions regarding resource-incentive ef-
fects, ideological orientations of affected groups, poten-
tial strategic complexities relating to the overall mix of
provisions and the larger political context, and strate-
gic adjustments in positions over time—appear to hold
potential to influence the extent to which resource-
incentive effects mobilize political action in any partic-
ular case. This suggests that efforts to understand pat-
terns of interest group advocacy associated with policy
reforms should account for not only resource-incentive
effects, but also other variables such as those outlined
above and perhaps others as well—including the extent
to which key political institutions (such as Congress) sig-
nal openness to learning of and responding to interest
group advocacy concerns.
It is important to recognize, however, that our find-
ings are subject to a number of limitations. First, our
analysis relates to just one policy reform in the US and
Congress’s reconsideration of it in one year (2017), so it
is important to recognize that policy feedback dynamics
may be different in other cases, circumstances, and/or
national settings. In addition, within the context of the
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ACA, our assessment is based on investigations of just
seven interest groups (albeit major and important ones),
and our findings might be supplemented productively if
other groups—or more specific subsets of them—were
also investigated. Third, our selection of provisions to in-
vestigate was based on the likely interests of these seven
groups in the ACA’s access related provisions. The dynam-
ics of resource-incentive based policy feedback at the
level of legal provisions might be different if cost or qual-
ity related provisions received more focus in our analy-
ses. Fourth, our data gathering processes were based on
existing information on group websites and additional in-
ternet searches, so it is possible that we missed policy
advocacy positions and/or activities thatwould provide a
more comprehensive picture of likely impacts of ACA pol-
icy feedback effects. Fifth, while our analyses provide in-
sight into patterns of ACA advocacy efforts, they are not
designed to yield strong insights on the effects of these
advocacy efforts on the final resolution of Congress’s ACA
repeal and replace debates. Finally, our analysis does not
directly control for alternative factors which might ex-
plain the patterns of positions taken and advocacy efforts
advancedduringACA the repeal and replace debates.We
do not, for example, attempt to disentangle resource-
incentive effects from ideological or partisan ties that
might also help explain positions and advocacy efforts
that were undertaken during 2017.
Nevertheless, our findings have implications for the
design of policy reforms and future research. They sug-
gest that policy reformers may productively draw on in-
sights from resource-incentive theories as they seek to
design sustainable reforms. However, they also point out
that the utility of these insights may be limited in key re-
spects. They may be limited by the extent to which the
policies have uncertain resource-incentive effects, are
subject to variable perceptions among key groups based
on their ideological orientations and the values they as-
sociate with various policy feedback effects, and are sub-
ject to complex interconnections among reform provi-
sions and factors in the larger socioeconomic-political
context that affect strategic judgments made by af-
fected groups.
Our findings also yield insights relevant to future re-
search. First, future research on policy feedback effects
should take account of resource-incentive effects, as well
as other factors that may limit their impact and impor-
tance in particular circumstances. Second, the findings
above suggest that policy feedback may give rise to ad-
vocacy dynamics that vary across provisions in a law, and
which therefore hold the potential to unravel a reform
through “a thousand cuts”, rather than through full re-
pudiation or repeal—an insight also noted by Patashnik
(2008, p. 32). Future research on the contexts in which
full repeal is likely to occur versus contexts where laws
may unravel as a result of progressive adjustments to key
provisions may therefore be appropriate, perhaps draw-
ing on Patashnik’s (2008) work in this area. Finally, our
discussion highlights once again the importance of exist-
ing literature suggesting that patterns of policy feedback
and group advocacy may change over time (Patashnik &
Zelizer, 2013; Pierson, 2000; Karch & Rose, 2017). This
suggests that there may be value in studies focused on
identifying factors that influence interest group decisions
to change positions and/or alter policy advocacy efforts,
and the likely magnitude and timing of these changes.
7. Conclusion
Patashnik and colleagues argue that the sustainability of
public interest reforms turns on their capacities to re-
make politics (Patashnik, 2008), and they also suggest
that there are limits to the impact of policy feedback
effects because “the capacity of public policies to re-
make politics is contingent, conditional, and contested”
(Patashnik & Zelizer, 2013, p. 1072). Our findings reveal
the existence of interest-group based policy advocacy
patterns that appear consistent with resource-incentive
effects of the ACA, and this suggests that there has been
at least some “re-making” of politics associated with the
ACA reform. The AMA, AHIP, key hospital groups, and
even portions of the business community are now de-
fending amajor American healthcare reform (and/or por-
tions thereof), rather than serving as an “axis of opposi-
tion” to expanded healthcare access. Although our anal-
ysis above does not directly address this point, this kind
of political change may provide at least part of the expla-
nation for why key portions of the ACA remained intact
a year after the election of a unified Republican govern-
ment that had campaigned on a platform advocating re-
peal and replacement of the ACA.
Our findings also suggest that the influence of
resource-incentive effects on patterns of interest group
advocacy may not be as straightforward as some might
expect. Groups that perceive or value resource effects
differently may engage in differing patterns of policy
advocacy. Policy advocacy patterns also appear to dif-
fer across provisions in ways that run counter to what
would be predicted by narrow applications of resource-
incentive theories to specific provisions. These differ-
ences may be contingent on interconnections among
ACA provisions and perhaps perceptions by interest
groups that are conditioned by both their ideological
orientations and broader political circumstances. Consis-
tent with existing literature, our investigations also un-
covered chronological variations in the positions and ad-
vocacy efforts undertaken by key groups, and this sug-
gests that the timing of key challenges and opportunities
may also affect policy advocacy patterns associated with
resource-incentive effects.
Thus, while our findings are consistent with the idea
that resource-incentive effects of public policies influ-
ence patterns of policy advocacy, they also suggest that
the impacts of resource-incentive based policy feedback
effects on interest group advocacy are not as simple as
somemight assume. Our hope is that this conclusion and
the ideas on resource-incentive based policy advocacy
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expressed above may inform future research efforts to
improve our understanding of both the current health-
care policy debate in the US and larger questions about
policy feedback effects and reform.
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